Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 96 Heft: 1 Seiten: 284-287.

Notwithstanding its overwhelming descriptive power for existing data, it is not clear whether the kinematic theory of Plamondon & Alimi could generate new insights into biomechanical constraints and psychological processes underlying the way organisms trade off speed for accuracy. The kinematic model should elaborate on the role of neuromotor noise and on biomechanical strategies for reducing endpoint variability related to such noise.

Op 4 mei 2011 overleed Koen Raes. Hij was verbonden aan de Vakgroep grondslagen en geschiedenis van het recht van de Universiteit Gent en speelde decennia lang als publieke intellectueel en ethicus een belangrijke rol in maatschappelijke en ethische debatten in Vlaanderen, België, Nederland, maar ook daarbuiten. In dit boek is een brede selectie van ingeleide teksten van hem opgenomen. Het verschijnt parallel met een (dubbel)nummer van het tijdschrift 'Ethiek en Maatschappij' - een tijdschrift door Koen Raes in 1998 opgericht (...) en waarvan hij tot recent ook de gedreven hoofdredacteur van was. Uit de hier door Gily Coene verzamelde teksten en uit de inleidingen erop blijkt overduidelijk hoe scherp en helder Koen Raes complexe maatschappelijk-ethische problemen en thema's in kaart kon brengen en hier een gefundeerde positie over kon ontwikkelen. (shrink)

Bundel essays over de invloed van de Duitse filosoof (1844-1900) op diverse cultuuruitingen.

Background: We aimed to determine the smallest changes in health-related quality of life (HRQoL) scores in the European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer Quality of Life Questionnaire core 30 and the Brain Cancer Module (QLQ-BN20), which could be considered as clinically meaningful in brain cancer patients. Materials and methods: World Health Organisation performance status (PS) and mini-mental state examination (MMSE) were used as clinical anchors appropriate to related subscales to determine the minimal clinically important differences (MCIDs) in HRQoL (...) change scores (range 0-100) in the QLQ-C30 and QLQ-BN20. A threshold of 0.2 standard deviation (SD) (small effect) was used to exclude anchor-based MCID estimates considered too small to inform interpretation. Results: Based on PS, our findings support the following integer estimates of the MCID for improvement and deterioration, respectively: physical (6, 9), role (14, 12), and cognitive functioning (8, 8); global health status (7, 4(star)), fatigue (12, 9), and motor dysfunction (4(star), 5). Anchoring with MMSE, cognitive functioning MCID estimates for improvement and deterioration were (11, 2(star)) and for communication deficit were (9, 7). Estimates with asterisks were <0.2 SD and were excluded from our MCID range of 5-14. Conclusion: These estimates can help clinicians evaluate changes in HRQoL over time, assess the value of a health care intervention and can be useful in determining sample sizes in designing future clinical trials. (shrink)

In view of a better comprehension of the current bad situation of the municipal finances, the evolution of the expenses of the Belgian municipalities has been investigated. Although the attention is focussed on a descriptive analysis, some explanatory indications are also given by analysing the expenses in functionof the number of inhabitants and of the geographical situation. Special attention was given to the evaluation of the potential inffoence of the amalgamation of the municipalities, which in 1976 reduced their number from (...) 2 359 to 596.The global municipal expenses have increased by circa 25 %. The pattern of expenditures remained fairly stable. There was a positive - although not rectilinear, and important exceptions exist - correlation between the population number and the level of expenses. The number of inhabitants also infiuences the destination of the revenues in a significantway. The amalgamation process seems to have only an indirect repercussion on the expenses, particularly by the change in the spreading of the municipalities over the different categories.Especially the remarkable and relevant inter-regional differentiation of the expenses - W alloon municipalities spend more money per inhabitant and following other priorities - needs further research. (shrink)

This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen.

In De alimentorum facultatibus, Book I, Ch. 1, Galen begins his discussion of the powers of foodstuffs by a rough sketch of the opinions of earlier physicians on this subject. He says that according to some of them these powers are only known on the basis of experience , according to others on the basis of a combination of experience and reasoning , whereas a third group gave priority of importance to reasoning . Galen proceeds to say that (...) there is considerable disagreement between these physicians on the topic in question and that, consequently, an unbiased testing of their opinions is necessary; this testing should operate by means of argumentation . Now there are two different starting-points for argumentation, i.e. perception and ‘distinct thinking’ . Then the text printed by Helmreich runs as follows: κα μς ναγκαν στιν ἢ θατρ τοτων ἢ μφοτροις χρσασθαι πρς τν το προκειμνου σκμματος ερεσιν: ‘It is necessary for us, too, to use either one of these or both of them in order to find the question under discussion.’. (shrink)

Galen's stories about his successes in predicting the development of an illness belong to the best-known anecdotes drawn from his writings. Brilliant pieces of self-presentation, they set Galen apart from his peers, who tried to cover up their ignorance by levelling accusations of magic and divination against their superior colleague. These accusations are usually interpreted as very real threats, as Roman law punished illicit magic and divination. Pointing out that Galen sometimes likes to present himself as a (...) mantis and a prophet, others have suggested that the accusations against Galen and his own self-presentation indicate that the border line between medicine and religion was still fluid. Both approaches correctly draw attention to the social reality that the accusations betray: they suggest that Galen belongs to a group of healers of dubious standing that populated the empire and thus show that medicine did not have a monopoly on healing. Yet such a socio-historical approach may not be sufficient. For one thing, both explanations have their limitations. Regarding the former, it can be said that Augustus' prohibition of divination aimed at controlling prediction about the emperor and one can doubt that a widespread clampdown of all forms of divination ever was intended. A possible objection to the second view is that throughout his oeuvre Galen emphasizes his medicine as a rational undertaking, even as a science . If one takes his self-presentation as a mantis to be more than metaphorical and to indicate the not yet fully crystallized identity of medicine as a separate scientific discipline, then Galen's usual way of understanding his own craft as a ‘science’ is in need of explanation. Besides such possible objections, a different set of questions still needs to be asked: why precisely were accusations of practising magic and divination levelled against Galen and why do they recur so frequently in his writings? Why divination and not, say, poisoning? (shrink)

This article analyzes the pediatric material in the Arabic commentaries (written tenth–fifteenth centuries) on the Hippocratic Aphorisms by exploring the traces of its late-antique origins and highlighting the influences of contemporary Islamic sources. This study demonstrates, first, how the commentaries assimilate Galenic pediatric theory through intricate elaborations and innovations; and second, that the commentators on the Aphorisms exhibit a strict theoretical interest in the causes and nature of childood diseases as opposed to their remedies. Consequently, it shows that therapeutic pediatric (...) material was restricted to other nonexegetical genres, such as the encyclopedias of Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī. The commentary material is thus a unique example of medieval Islamic theoria or theoretical medicine, which transmitted and transformed Galenic and early medieval theoretical explanations of childhood illnesses through the centuries. (shrink)

This work brings together Philip van der Eijk's previously published essays on the close connections that existed between medicine and philosophy throughout antiquity. Medical authors such as the Hippocratic writers, Diocles, Galen, Soranus and Caelius Aurelianus elaborated on philosophical methods such as causal explanation, definition and division and applied key concepts such as the notion of nature to their understanding of the human body. Similarly, philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle were highly valued for their contributions to medicine. This (...) interaction was particularly striking in the study of the human soul in its relation to the body, as illustrated by approaches to specific topics such as intellect, sleep and dreams, and diet and drugs. With a detailed introduction surveying the subject as a whole and an essay on Aristotle's treatment of sleep, this wide-ranging and accessible collection is essential reading for the student of ancient philosophy and science. (shrink)

This paper is an examination of Galen Strawson’s theory of the human person as a succession of momentary selves (or SESMETs: Subjects of Experience that are Single MEntal Things). Insofar as there is a clear distinction between enduring objects and events or processes, SESMETs would seem to partake of the features of both, for they are at once short‐lived subjects of consciousness and brief episodes of consciousness. Strawson in fact rejects the object/ process distinction, and contends that there is (...) no sense in which a SESMET is a process and a rock is not a process. Strawson’s rejection of the object/process distinction is essential to his attempt to meet the charge that the concept of a SESMET is an incoherent conflation of the concept ‘object’ and the concept ‘process.’ But many philosophers will find the rejection of the object/process distinction objectionable on general metaphysical grounds. I suggest that these philosophers (I am one of them) and Strawson will not be able usefully to discuss issues in the philosophy of mind (such as his theory of SESMETs) till they have reached agreement about what the most fundamental ontological categories are. (shrink)

Van Helmont's chemistry and medicine played a prominent part in the seventeenth-century opposition to Aristotelian natural philosophy and to Galenic medicine. Helmontian works, which rapidly achieved great notoriety all over Europe, gave rise to the most influential version of the chemical philosophy. Helmontian terms such as Archeus, Gas and Alkahest all became part of the accepted vocabulary of seventeenth-century science and medicine.

The stories we live by: On narrative self-constitution and self-understanding In spite of what Galen Strawson defends, it is claimed that a narrative attitude – as a psychological fact – is of great use for self-reflective beings in making their experiences understandable and managing their lives. Secondly, there is doubt about the existence of what Marya Schechtman called a ‘narrative self’, i.e. a self that is constituted by the stories people tell about themselves. It is proposed to leave the (...) constitution question aside and to choose, like Peter Goldie did before, for the ‘narrative sense of self’ as an anchor point when we want to understand how people think about their lives and themselves in narrative terms. Finally, it is disputed that narrative self-understanding would be impossible or should be banished to the world of fiction, as anti-narrativists contend. Although the life stories of people are inevitably perspectival and in essence contestable, they are always factual stories that can be true and false and thus play a significant role in better understanding ourselves and others. (shrink)

In classical speculation on medical matters health is conceived of as a bodily statewhich is in accordance with Nature. It is a state of natural balance in the mixture (complexio) of the primary qualities of the human body. Although few of the details in theancient natural philosophy and the Galenic philosophy of health have survived, it is important to note that two of the ancient ideas still influence the thoughts: the idea ofa balance between opposing elements or forces, and, in (...) particular, the idea of a natural or normal state of the living organism. In the actual reflection there is a forceful attempt to formulate a conception of health and disease in terms of biological norms where the interpretation is unambiguous. According to this conception the biological norms are related to certain natural goals (e.g. survival). These goals are not attributed to the body for the outside, but belong to the internal constitution of the body. In this paper the author wants to present the essential tenets and main merits of such a theory, more precisely the bio-statistical theory of the American philosopher Christopher Boorse. In a second phase he points out a critical assessment of this perspective, mainly focussing on the claims of a value-free scientific approach and of neutrality. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument makes salient the difficulties facing attempts to reconcile determinism and agency. Others go further. Derk Pereboom, for instance, contends that science provides compelling evidence that no action is free, and Galen Strawson argues that conditions for genuinely free action are flatly unsatisfiable. Against such skepticism about free will, the paper introduces considerations in support of the idea that there are probably good reasons to think that conditions for free actions—real agency—are sometimes satisfied, that ascriptions (...) of agency are sometimes true, but that truthmakers for these ascriptions could be wholly deterministic in a way that might seem to, but does not in fact, place them at odds with the possibility of genuinely free action. (shrink)

According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.

Pleidooi voor de beleving als kennis-instrument.

This essay surveys the main objections to aesthetic hedonism, the view that aesthetic value is reducible to the value of aesthetic pleasure or experience. Hedonism is the dominant view of aesthetic value, but a spate of recent criticisms has drawn its accuracy into question. I introduce some distinctions crucial to the criticisms, before using the bulk of the essay to identify and review six major lines of argument that hedonism's critics have employed against it. Whether or not these arguments suffice (...) to refute hedonism decisively, I argue that its privileged status, as the sole contender in aesthetic value theory, is detrimental to downstream research on aesthetic phenomena. The essay concludes with an overview of current work and promising avenues of inquiry into non-hedonic alternatives. (shrink)

A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This essay is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of the declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. I propose a semantic explanation on which declaratives covertly host a "know"-parenthetical. A speaker (...) is thereby represented as knowing the proposition expressed because that is the semantic contribution of the parenthetical. I call this view parentheticalism and defend that it better explains knowledge representation than alternatives. As a consequence of outperforming assertoric explanations, parentheticalism opens the door to eliminating the act-type of assertion from linguistic theorizing. (shrink)

'Volgens de Duitse denker Carl Schmitt is zonder vijandbeeld geen politiek mogelijk,' schreven Coen Simon en Frank Meester aan Arnon Grunberg. Zij vroegen hem Het begrip politiek van Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) te lezen om na te gaan wat hij ons nu nog te zeggen heeft. Hoeveel natiestaat hebben wij nodig? Hoeveel vijanden? Waartoe dient politiek? En is een samenleving zonder oorlog en geweld mogelijk? Aan de hand van Schmitt en denkers als Walter Benjamin en Jacques Derrida probeert Grunberg antwoord (...) te geven op die vragen. 'Onze cultuur heeft de vegetarische slager voortgebracht en zal uiteindelijk ook de geweldloze oorlog produceren. Hoe die er precies uit zal zien is onduidelijk, maar Schmitts vermoeden dat die oorlog om de oorlog eens en voor altijd uit te roeien gruwelijk zal zijn lijkt me gerechtvaardigd,' aldus Grunberg. Maar ook stelt hij dat er geen rechtvaardigheid kan bestaan als het geweld wordt afgezworen. In Vriend & vijand legt Grunberg de vinger op zowel de zere plekken van de parlementaire democratie als de kritiek erop. Vrienden en vijanden van deze democratie mogen dit essay niet aan zich voorbij laten gaan"--Back cover. (shrink)

What is it like to be an octopus, one of those eight-armed, infinitely flexible sea creatures with a nervous system distributed over head, eyes and arms? One interesting approach is to argue that octopuses, because of their distributed nervous systems, are likely to possess disunified consciousness (Carls-Diamante 2017). However, this supposed isomorphism between a “unified” nervous system and “unified” consciousness is problematic, since the term “unity” is taken as a “given” even though it is far from clear what it means. (...) I will argue that explaining the structure of consciousness requires a prior explanation in terms of how it is achieved by the organism through sensorimotor integration. On this account, the structure of an organism’s consciousness is explained partly by what the external world is like, and partly by how the organism’s body, senses and nervous system enable the organism to interact with the external world. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played (...) by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science. (shrink)

Onderzoek naar idealisme en betrokkenheid onder de Nederlandse bevolking.

The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers (...) are correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish was an English natural philosopher. Influenced by Hobbes and by ancient Stoicism, she held that the created, natural world is purely material; there are no incorporeal substances that causally affect the world in the course of nature. However, she parts company with Hobbes and sides with the Stoics in rejecting a participate theory of matter. Instead, she holds that matter is a continuum. She rejects the mechanical philosophy's account of the essence of matter as simply extension. For Cavendish, (...) matter is also essentially living, sensing, and rational. She also rejects the mechanical philosophy's explanation of change solely in terms of transference of motion. Her own explanation of change relies upon a notion of "occasional cause." This paper argues that Cavendish's occasional causes are not to be confused with those of Malebranche; hers have some efficient causal powers. It traces the concept of an occasional cause from the ancient Stoics, through Galen, to Renaissance natural philosophers such as J. B. van Helmont, and ultimately to Cavendish and to Descartes. Thus, the aim of the paper is to explicate Cavendish's non-mechanical model of natural change and to show how the key concept in this model, that of "occasional cause," has a long philosophical pedigree. L'anglaise Margaret Cavendish pratique la philosophic naturelle. Sous l'influence de Hobbes et du stoïcisme ancien, elle a soutenu que le monde naturel créé est purement matériel ; dans le cours de la nature, il n'y a pas de substances incorporelles qui affectent causalement le monde. Elle se sépare néanmoins de Hobbes et rejoint les Stoïciens dans son rejet d'une théorie de la matière particulaire. Elle considère au contraire que la matière est un continuum. Elle rejette l'explication de l'essence de la matière comme simple extension, fournie par la philosophic mécaniste. Pour Cavendish, la matière est de plus essentiellement vivante, sentante et rationnelle. Elle rejette aussi l'explication mécaniste du changement en simples termes de transmission de mouvement. Sa propre explication du changement s'appuie sur la notion de cause occasionnelle. Cet article defend l'idée que les causes occasionnelles de Cavendish ne doivent pas être confondues avec celles de Malebranche ; les siennes ont des pouvoirs causaux efficients. Il permet done de suivre l'histoire du concept de cause occasionnelle des anciens Stoïciens, en passant ensuite par Galien jusqu'aux Philosophes de la nature de la Renaissance, comme J. B. van Helmont, et finalement jusqu'à Cavendish et Descartes. Le but de cet article est ainsi de rendre explicite le modèle que Cavendish donne du changement naturel et de montrer comment le concept clé de ce modèle, celui de cause occasionnelle, est le produit d'une longue filiation philosophique. (shrink)

Rationalism offers an account of moral properties as a subset of the properties which serve to rationalize right actions, and these properties are fit to be the referents of our moral terms. That fitness can be exploited in constructing an externalist theory of reference determination for these terms. The resulting externalist theory draws support from standard responses to Moral Twin-Earth scenarios. The relevance of these responses to moral semantics has recently beenvigorously challenged by Dowell and by Schroeter and Schroeter. The (...) social character of meaning relations, which can explain the openness of questions about an analysis, may thereby also make Twin-Earth judgements beside the point. But the resources available to translators go beyond semantic competence and it is these resources that nonetheless make the Moral Twin-Earth responses relevant. (shrink)

Cognition played a pivotal role in the acceleration of technological innovation during the Industrial Revolution. Growing affluence may have provided favourable environmental conditions for a boost in cognition, enabling individuals to tackle more complex problems. Dynamical systems thinking may provide useful tools to describe sudden transitions like the Industrial Revolution, by modelling the recursive feedback between psychology and environment.

This volume tackles Gödel's two-stage project of first using Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to reconstruct and develop Leibniz' monadology, and then founding classical mathematics on the metaphysics thus obtained. The author analyses the historical and systematic aspects of that project, and then evaluates it, with an emphasis on the second stage.

Agent-causal accounts aim to secure greater control than can be secured by any event-causal libertarian account. Assuming that all it requires is possible, an integrated agent-causal view succeeds at this goal and adequately characterizes free will. Such a view captures well the common idea that free agents are originators of their free actions. Responses are offered to Peter van Inwagen’s challenge to agent-causal views and to Galen Strawson’s argument that free will is impossible. A claim that free will requires (...) downward causation—of a sort involving the supersession of microlevel laws—is rejected. (shrink)